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A PERSPECTIVE ON "TEMPER IN THE
COURT: A FORUM ON JUDICIAL CIVILITY"
Norman L. Greene*

[I]f the allegation is that he yells at people, if that's removable
conduct, then no judge would be left sitting.**

For years, complaints have circulated about the lack of civility
among lawyers; no reasonable observer could deny that lawyers
could treat each other much better.' Today, the focus on civility in
the profession has broadened to include judges as well as lawyers.2
The issue of judicial civility is not about the merits of any particular
decision or an improvement in decision-making. Nor is it intended
to be a threat to judicial independence to make appropriate decisions. Instead, its aim is to improve the tone of justice in the
courts.
* Copyright (c) (1996) by Norman L. Greene. Mr. Greene is a partner in the
New York City law firm of Schoeman Marsh & Updike. He is the Chair of the Committee on Lectures and Continuing Education at the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, a co-sponsoring committee of "Temper in the Court."
** Lawyer for New York State judge quoted in James Dao, Conduct Panel Plans
ChargesAgainst Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1996, at B1,B2; see also Gordon Hunter,
Vitriol Mounts as McBryde Mandamus Arguments Approach, TEX. LAWYER, Apr. 15,
1996, at 2 (quoting attorney for federal judge as saying that "if [the use of] pejorative
adjectives become the judicial council's standard [for removing cases from judges, the
judicial council's] workload could get 'quite burdensome' ").
1. Some judges have complained that lawyers could treat judges better as well.
Although this article focusses on judicial intemperate conduct, it is not to excuse or
overlook intemperance on behalf of others in the judicial system, including lawyers.
2. Pamela Coyle, Bench Stress, ABA J., Dec. 1995, at 60 (noting that although
the "affliction [of intemperance] is not so pervasive as to rule the bench, many say it is
further undermining the public's already shaky confidence in the legal system."). The
article surveys the problem of judicial intemperance and considers reforms already
underway to deal with the problem. See also, Mark A. Neubauer, Things You Have
Wanted To Tell A Judge (But Didn't Dare), 21 LITIGATION, Fall 1994 at 17. It is perhaps no accident that these two articles have appeared so recently on the subject of
judicial temperance, and they underscore the growing sense of the temperance
problem.
3. In a recent statement, four sitting judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Judges Newman, Lumbard, Feinberg and Oakes) spoke
out against criticism of a federal judge sitting in the Southern District of New York
and the calls for his impeachment or resignation for ruling that certain evidence
against a confessed drug courier should be suppressed. Dan Van Natta, Judges Defend Colleaguefrom Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1996, at B1-2 (noting, among other
things, that " '[a]ttacks on a judge risk inhibition of all judges as they conscientiously
endeavor to discharge their constitutional responsibilities.' "; potential threats by the
President to call for the federal judge's resignation constituted" 'extraordinary intimi-
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dation.' ") (The federal judge subsequently reversed himself, and decided the evidence would be admissible.).
Chief Justice William Rehnquist likewise stated that federal judges should never be
threatened with removal because of their rulings, noting that judicial independence is
"'one of the crown jewels of our system of government.'" Linda Greenhouse. Rehnquist Joins Fray on Rulings, Defending Judicial Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
1996, at Al. According to the Chief Justice, " 'there is a wrong way and a right way to
go about putting a popular imprint on the judiciary.' " Id. at B7. Cf. Katharine Q.
Seelye, Dole Rejects Rehnquist Criticism on Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1996 (not
suggesting that "'we ought to be able to pressure judges, but we ought to be able to
criticize judges when we think they've made a mistake.' ").
Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals has recently stated her
"grave concern" about "the tone, frequency and volume" of recent criticism of the
courts; she noted that "the harsh criticism threatens the judiciary's independence,
without which judges are 'at risk of being chilled, tempted to reach results that conform to opinion polls and popular passions.'" Daniel Wise, Kaye Warns Judiciary Is
Threatened, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 22. 1996, at 1.
Twenty-six bar groups and six law school deans subscribed to a statement supporting the independence of the judiciary and undertaking to create a "Joint Committee
to Preserve the Independence of the Judiciary." Daniel Wise, 26 Bar Groups Join to
Defend the Judiciary, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 8, 1996, at 1-2. See also, Letter from Governor
George E. Pataki to the Editor, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 1996, at 2 (responding to resolution by the bar groups and law school deans and defending his request for the removal
of a particular judge on grounds of the judge's alleged belief that domestic violence is
not a crime).
According to the statement of the bar groups and law school deans, among other
things, the "mission of the Joint Committee -[shall be] to develop proposals for insuring the independence of the judiciary from partisan attack and to coordinate timely
responses to intemperate or misleading attacks upon individual judges or the judicial
system." Daniel Wise, 26 Bar Groups Join to Defend the Judiciary, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 8,
1996, at 1. The statement further noted that judges "should not be subject to the fear
of sanction or removal from office solely upon the basis of a decision, ruling or opinion, lawfully taken pursuant to the exercise of judicial discretion." Id.
These statements by the Second Circuit, the Chief Justice, the Chief Judge and the
joint group of deans and bar associations were preceded by other strong statements in
favor of judicial independence and objections to attacks on particular judges and the
courts.

For example, to mention a couple of them, a letter to the editor of the New York
Law Journal complained about a recent attack on a judge, whose "virulence... creates an atmosphere of intimidation for all judges who must from time to time make
unpopular decisions," as a "personal attack" which "was lynch-like in its nature," and
as "an assault on judicial independence which is the cornerstone of our system of
justice." Letter from Arthur L. Liman, Esq. to the Editor, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 16, 1996, at
2.
Another letter to the editor from President Barbara Paul Robinson of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in the New York Law Journal (Mar. 6, 1996,
at 2), responded to calls by the governor for impeachment of a judge and his removal
from office regardless of the findings of the Commission on Judicial Conduct reviewing the matter by stating that it threatened "the independence of the entire judiciary."
She added that "vitriolic attacks on individuals and specific court decisions intimidate
all judges, not only those few that deserve scrutiny and, in doing so, undermine our
system of justice." Id.; see also, John Feerick, Judicial Independence and the Impartial
Administration of Justice, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 3, 1996, at 2.
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"Temper in the Court" arose from the experience of seeing some
judges conduct themselves in the courtroom impolitely, if not abusively, toward persons who appeared before them. These judges
acted in ways unacceptable in almost every other setting, whether
in a home, on a playground, or in an office. As a letter read at

"Temper in the Court" stated, the judge may at times become a
"snarling demon who lawyers fear to come before." This is despite
the fact that the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates temperance as
part of a judge's job.4
Judicial incivility is of a markedly different magnitude than lawyer incivility. When a lawyer is uncivil to fellow lawyers, the recipi-

ent of the abuse may respond in kind, seek judicial assistance or
walk away from the miscreant. When a lawyer is uncivil to a judge,
the judge has numerous remedies, including, in extreme cases,
holding a lawyer in contempt.

Where the judge is abusive, however, the remedies are fewer. If
a lawyer responds in kind, he risks prejudicing his client's rights or
being subjected to a disciplinary proceeding. Judicial assistance is
not ordinarily available, certainly not immediately; nor is walking
away an option. Too often the lawyer sees himself as having no

other option than to take the abuse.
Some types of judicial abuse have already reached the public's
moral radar screen. A judge who engages in abuse exhibiting a
racial, religious, or gender bias, for example, courts serious trouble.
If the newspapers or voters hear about it, let alone the state commission on judicial conduct, an uproar should follow.
A recent study of the impact of popular sentiment on judicial impartiality in death
penalty cases appears in Stephen B. Bright and Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the
Politics of Death:Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital
Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 760 (1995) (noting that "unpopular decisions in capital
cases, even when clearly compelled by law, may cost a judge her seat on the bench or
promotion to a higher court."); see also, id. at 832 (adverting to judges who "continue
to be voted off trial and appellate courts for their decisions in capital cases" to be
"replaced with judges who are little more than conductors on railroads to the execution chambers"; "only federal judges have the independence and job security that
enable them to enforce the protections of the constitution when doing so would be
vastly unpopular.").
4. See N.Y. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3A(3) (McKinney 1984):
A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity, and
should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of his staff, court officials, and
others subject to his direction and control.
See also, id. at Canon 3A(7) (Commentary) ("Temperate conduct of judicial proceedings is essential to the fair administration of justice.").
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But blatant rudeness, nastiness, and arrogance are just beginning
to become a public issue and, although rarely covered in the press,
are well known to people who are frequently in the courts.5 For
example, when recently asked what happened to his motion for
summary judgment, a client responded, "The judge denied the motion, and she was nasty." Before becoming a litigant, the client
would not even have known about such behavior.
A trial attorney's frustration with a judge's conduct recently
came to light when the attorney sought an ethics opinion permitting him to publish a letter discussing the conduct of the particular
judge. According to the ethics opinion, the lawyer, using surprisingly colorful language, stated in his request for the opinion that he
believed that the judge had "committed serious acts of judicial misconduct during [a] trial, including hostile, belligerent, aggressive,
abusive, intimidating and generally intemperate conduct directed
at the inquirer and his co-counsel."'6 The attorney added that he
believed that the "judge did so because of a combination of incompetence, animus and lack of judicial temperance," and based upon

5. See Neubauer, supra note 2, at 17 ("Everyone has experienced appearing
before judges who are simply gratuitously mean and nasty. They hurl insults at lawyers needlessly. Their attacks on lawyers' honesty and intelligence are handed out
without discrimination to everyone who appears before them. They build their own
egos by tearing down the dignity of others, knowing that lawyers cannot answer the
judge without fear of contempt or at least a loss of their clients' position. So we sit
stoically as we are verbally abused."); e.g., Jim Dwyer, Making Dumb Remarks is
Judge's Only Blunder, DAILY NEws, Apr. 23, 1996, at 5, 30. ("[Judge] got very highhanded with some prosecutors. To one, he said: 'When I say sit down, you sit. When
I say stand, you stand. When I say speak, you speak. When I say don't speak, you
don't speak. Now, get out of my courtroom."'). A recent example of judicial intemperance becoming a public issue is the nationally reported case of a federal judge who
filed a writ of mandamus to regain control over two cases that were removed from his
docket by an administrative judge. The administrative judge claims the reason for the
removal was the federal judge's "abusive and intemperate attacks." One Federal
Judge Does Battle With 19 Others, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1996, at B6; Gordon Hunter,
Vitriol Mounts as McBryde Mandamus Arguments Approach, TEX. LAWYER, Apr. 15,
1996, at 2. To bolster his position that the case removals were improper, the federal
judge's reply brief footnotes "rather unflattering assessments lawyers made anonlymously of three members of the judicial council in the current Almanac of the Federal Judiciary." Id. The chief judge of the Eastern District of Louisiana is portrayed
as "rude, hostile and extremely overbearing ....reduc[ing] lawyers to tears." Id.; see
also Today's News, N.Y. L.J., May 7, 1996, p.1 (quoting federal judge in granting a
lawyer's motion to withdraw as stating, "You were too weak as a lawyer and as a man
to handle a case of this importance.").
6. Formal Opinion 1996-1 of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York's
Committee on Professionaland JudicialEthics, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 29, 1996, at 2 [hereinafter Ethics Opinion].
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his inquiry from others with experience with the judge, "that his
'7
conduct in this case was typical of him."
The ethics opinion, with qualifications, permitted the attorney to
publish such a letter.8 The consequences of attorneys publishing
such letters about abusive judges, especially if such letters were
widespread, might be substantial. To the extent that judges are
prohibited by professional rules from responding to defend themselves, there also may be issues of fairness raised. Whether the
letters or the threat of them would be a deterrent to abusive conduct is unclear, although judges would undoubtedly prefer not to
see letters about themselves in the newspapers. Lawyers might
likewise prefer not to write such letters and become embroiled in a
controversy that might leave some doubt concerning who was right
and who was wrong.
What constitutes intemperance may vary substantially from case
to case. Without cataloging the range of intemperate conduct,
much is in the tone, not just the words. "Sit down, mister," or
"where do you practice, counselor," "take off your hat [or coat] in
my courtroom" can be as abusive, with the proper (or improper)
tone, as common insults, such as "shut up" and the like. Unfortunately, the transcript does not capture any tone whatsoever, let
alone the vicious and nasty one; but rest assured, no one in the
courtroom misses it.9
A lawyer sitting in a courtroom all morning after watching a
judge handle motions turned to another lawyer and said: "Where's
the psychiatrist?" When asked what he was talking about, the first
lawyer gestured toward the judge with a look of disgust and said,
"Did you see that guy?" An out-of-town lawyer, after observing
one motion day, a judge's repertory of nastiness, insults, and
threats to one person after another who came before him, asked a
7. Id.
8. The Committee's opinion urged the inquirer "to avoid petty criticisms, and to

make critical statements only when motivated by a desire to improve the quality of
the judiciary and the legal system in general, and then to present his views only in a
temperate, dignified manner." Id. As the opinion further noted:
[Aln attorney may properly criticize a judge for conduct in an action that is
no longer pending so long as the attorney is not knowingly making false
accusations against the judge and strives to voice the criticisms in a temperate and dignified manner.
Id.
9. Coyle, supra note 2, at 62 ("An often expressionless court transcript also does

not give voice to impatience, to rudeness and other demeanor issues."). The article
quotes an official at a judicial conduct agency to say that "[tlone makes all the difference." Id.
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colleague, in amazement, "What do lawyers in this state think
about him?" The response was, "They hate him."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Santa Maria v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad'° found that abusive conduct by a judge reached such a magnitude that it vacated a
judgment and granted a party a new trial before a new judge."
Among the abuses catalogued by the Second Circuit were a "sarcastic cross-examination by the court of the plaintiff's expert witnesses"; 12 attacking plaintiff's counsel for failing "to sit down
quickly enough to suit the court"; and failing to grant a modest
continuance to allow a replacement counsel to prepare.' 3 The court
"displayed an antipathy to [plaintiff's] claim that went beyond judicial skepticism"' 4 as well as hostility toward plaintiff's trial coun10. -F.3d-, No. 95-7230, 1996 WL 118585 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 1996).
11. Id. at *12. The Second Circuit recounted several incidents that demonstrated
a problem between the trial judge and the counsel for the plaintiff. In vacating the
judgment, the circuit court did not focus on any failings of the attorney, but on the
trial court's responses. The problem the trial court had with plaintiff's counsel
culminated in a finding of contempt against plaintiff's counsel, for what the trial court
described as:
[A] failure to obey a direct order of the Court and for your display of absolute arrogance and just an intent not to pay any attention on [sic] the order
of the court. It is very simple. I told you to sit down. You wouldn't. I told
you to sit down again. You wouldn't.
Id. at *10. One example of the trial court's interaction with the attorney that is recounted in the circuit court opinion occurred, during one recess, when the trial judge
gave the attorney the following warning for asking a question over a sustained
objection:
Counsel, I have to tell you something. You pull what you pulled before
where there was an objection taken that's to purely objectionable material
and you repeat it as if it were a fact, I will declare a mistrial and I will charge
you for the costs of impaneling the jury and recommend that you not be
permitted to practice in this district again. Got the picture?
Id., at *2. Still another example occurred on the third day of trial, when plaintiff's
attorney said to a witness, "I want to show you what I have marked as Plaintiff Exhibits 11, 12 and 13 which the defendant has supplied us with, the exact cost involved in
the accident. And I want you to look at that, please." The defendant's attorney objected and the court told plaintiff's attorney, "If you want to testify I will swear you
and I will disqualify you to be the lawyer because you cannot testify and be the lawyer
in the same case. The way to show an exhibit to the witness is: 'I show you exhibit soand-so. Can you tell me what it is?' Period." Id. On another day, the trial judge
sustained an objection to a question posed on cross-examination by the plaintiff's
attorney. Plaintiff's attorney tried to rationalize the appropriateness of the question
and the trial judge responded: "You're finished. Sit down. Ladies and gentlemen,
take a break. I've made a ruling. Sit down. Mr. Marshal, assist him to sit down." Id.
at *4.
12. 1996 WL 118585, at *9.
13. 1996 WL 118585, at *10.
14. 1996 WL 118585, at *9.
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sel. 15 The Second Circuit left no doubt that judicial incivility is not
merely a problem of overly sensitive lawyers but a problem of subis necesstantive rights. As the Court stated, "[J]udicial decorum
16
trial.'
fair
a
to
right
litigant's
sary to preserve the
The issue of judicial civility is not about lawyers who are not
"tough enough to take it." Litigation should not be about fighting
for one's client's rights in the face of abuse and living with humiliation. Rather, the issue is about what is the legal system going to do
about judges who insist on dishing it out, or as stated by at least
one speaker in "Temper in the Court," about "bullies." 17
Some explanations for judicial incivility heard in "Temper in the
Court" and elsewhere are that judges are human and have human
frailties; their courtrooms are congested or dilapidated or their resources are inadequate; they are underpaid; they have a need to
manage their crushing caseload and to achieve settlements or
otherwise dispose of cases; they have a sense of their own
powerlessness; they are unable to deal with stress and feel that they
have no recourse other than to act intemperately; 18 they are upset
that a case is being prosecuted rather than being the subject of a
plea; and they are baited by lawyers or frustrated by unprepared
lawyers ("defenses" recently rejected by the Second Circuit). 19
A panelist also noted that the judicial role is so set up within the
legal system that abuse of power may be sanctioned and even supported; and she referred to research on related matters. In other
words, the amount of power judges have encourages intemperate
behavior, including in those judges who might not otherwise have
been predisposed to behave in that manner.20
15.
16.
17.
that a

1996 WL 118585, at *7.
1996 WL 118585, at *10.
See Coyle, supra note 2, at 61 (quoting judge that "[t]here is no sorrier sight
judicial bully . . . because [a judge is] not fighting people who have equal

power.").
18. See also, Coyle, supra at 61 ("Judges and scholars agree that the combination
of too much stress and too much ego may be behind these judicial outbursts.").
19. Santa Maria, 1996 WL 118585, at *5 & *10 (criticizing judge for "chiding"
attorney "for having 'poorly, if ever, prepared ..... ' ) ("A judge must strive to be a

model of patience and impartiality, even when faced with an irritating attorney.").
The Second Circuit's opinion insisted on a higher level of judicial civility than even
some lawyers do-e.g., those who would make excuses for judicial incivility by sug-

gesting that "it is not as bad as all that," "you have to learn to put up with it," it is the
lawyer's fault, and the like. After Santa Maria,such lawyers may well find themselves
in the peculiar position of accepting or advocating a lower standard of behavior for
judges than the Second Circuit established as necessary for the benefit of themselves
and their clients.
20. See Neubauer, supra note 2, at 17:
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Another panelist suggested that defense lawyers for unpopular
2
defendants may be more vulnerable to abuse. '
There are some obvious responses to these explanations. First,
the Code of Judicial Conduct allows no "affirmative defenses" to
abusive behavior by judges (whether it be the "defense" of dilapidated facilities or anything else), and following that Code is their
job. Second, in some cases, blaming the lawyer wrongly shifts the
focus of the problem to the victim of the intemperance (namely,
the lawyer), rather than to the intemperate actor. Third, no one
forces a judge to serve, and if his working conditions are so unpleasant, he need only resign to put himself out of his misery.
A judge may improve civility in the courtroom by setting an example. For instance, in a recent case, a judge calmly observed a
dispute among cantankerous lawyers, without comment, on a motion before him. When the judge's turn came, he held up one of
the lawyer's letters and said:
I see that you have used the word "outrageous" in referring to
your adversary's conduct. Such a word demeans you and demeans the Court. There is no reason for that. I also see that
you have indicated that because your adversary is just a couple
of years out of law school, she does not know anything. Again,
there is no reason for that, and just because she is young, that
does not mean that this is true.
It will be some time before the lawyers abuse each other in that
2
judge's courtroom.
Some panelists cautioned that most judges have no incivility
problem and that the subject of the panel was a small minority of
them. Yet others agreed that the problem was significant and
should be addressed. Different measures for dealing with intemperance were suggested by the panelists, depending upon whether
the judge was having a bad day or had exhibited a pattern of abuse.
These included the following: make a record of the abuse; send a
senior lawyer to sit in on the trial; complain to the administrative
They sit like feudal lords, high upon exalted thrones. They wear special
robes to signify their supreme authority. They wield wooden scepters that
they pound to emphasize their power. We approach their thrones with supplication, asking if we could please them .... In response to the insults and
the denial of our pleas for aid, we bow our heads in tribute and hypocritically say, 'Thank you, Your Honor.'
21. See also, Letter from Thomas F. Liotti, Esq. to the Editor, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4,
1996, at 2 ("Why do we not hear calls for removal when a judge unfairly attacks a
defense lawyer? The reason is clear. It is not politically correct.").
22. Neubauer, supra note 2, at 17 ("Judges cannot expect lawyers to be civil to one
another until the judges themselves demonstrate civility on the bench.").
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judge, who might speak to the judge, or if the judge is in criminal

term, transfer him to civil to lessen the impact on the system (lives
being more important than property); make a recusal motion; report the conduct to the New York State Commission on Judicial

Conduct (although intemperance will not always lead to action by
the Commission, or if it does, only in a private letter of reprimand
which we were told frequently has a salutary effect); 23 complain to
the judiciary committee of the bar association which may have oc-

casion to evaluate the judge for appointment or in connection with
an election;24 and provide judges with additional education and

training.25

Other judges are also encouraged to report the misconduct
should they become aware of it. Although there was skepticism

about whether many judges would make such reports because of a
human tendency of judges, like others, to "close ranks" to protect
23. As noted in the Ethics Opinion, supra note 6, the trial lawyer seeking the opinion had complained to the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, which
had declined to take action against the judge. The opinion noted, however, in permitting the lawyer to write about the episode, that there is conduct that "does not rise to
the level of a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, but that is nonetheless of
sufficient magnitude-particularly when viewed in the aggregate-to be worthy of
the legal community's attention."
The Commission on Judicial Conduct has been attacked as ineffective. See Joyce
Purnick, Low Priority for the Judging of the Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1996, at B1
(stating that Commission's budget dwindled from $2.2 million in 1988 to $1.6 million
in 1996, and it has half the staff that it had five years ago; "it has one half-time investigator, takes two years to resolve a serious case and operates in officially sanctioned
secret."); State Politicians to Scrutinize Judicial-Conduct Panel, N.Y. POST, Mar. 1,
1996, at 6 (quoting Congresswoman Nita Lowey stating that "[wIe must ensure that
the Commission on Judicial Conduct doesn't become the Commission on Judicial
Cover-ups"; quoting Michael Letwin of the Association of Legal Aid Attorneys to
state, "The commission is not known for exercising a great deal of control over judicial misconduct"; and Gerald Stem of the Commission to state that the budget of the
Commission has been cut, and together with cuts in staff, the Commission's ability to
investigate has been hampered.).
The failure adequately to discipline judges and other professionals has been noted.
Pumick, supra, at B1 (quoting Prof. Stephen Gillers of New York University School
of Law: "The state of New York and American jurisdictions do not adequately discipline professionals, whether they are lawyers, doctors or judges.... As a result, you
have triage. Judicial conduct commissions pick the really worst cases, cases in which
lawyers steal or judges accept bribes or appear on the bench drunk.").
24. Coyle, supra note 2, at 63 (quoting judge to say that "screening for temperament is the most difficult part of picking judges, and that even the painstaking federal
appointment process sometimes misses.").
25. See id., at 62 ("As the judicial distemper problem has gained recognition,
states have streamlined discipline processes and added lay members to bolster public
input and support. Federal courts are making it easier to file complaints. Courtwatch groups seem to be growing and gaining power. Training for judges now routinely includes ethics and demeanor sessions.").
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their own or because there was a "thin black robe of silence"
among judges, some judges have apparently made a report. No
one suggested that the lawyer respond in kind; the advice was
strongly to the contrary. A lawyer who does so invites criminal
contempt, which, among other things, requires the disciplinary
committee to bring an onerous proceeding against the lawyer. (Because of the drastic ramifications of contempt, judges were cautioned to consider other lesser means for dealing with the problem
lawyer.) There was also a comment that if the lawyer does not
respect the particular judge, he should at least respect the office.
But no one seriously contended that the lawyer needs to endure
bullying judicial tactics. Reference was made to the injurious psychological effect on an individual lawyer of humiliating judicial
abuse. Yet one speaker suggested that too many lawyers will accept it, perceiving that they have an interest in getting along and
going along with the system and fearing to be identified as "troublemakers." Lawyers may also worry that if they report the behavior, they may suffer retaliation, even from other judges. They may
also believe that nothing will be done, or if something is done, it
may take too long.
The forum was not intended to be an exercise in "piling on"
judges. The important work performed by judges-in resolving
"the most difficult and complicated issues facing a society: how
best to get citizens to obey society's rules, how to punish them
when they do not, and how to ensure that the agents of our government do not exceed the authority they have been given"-are well
known, 6 Judges are concededly entitled to "somewhat more than
the daily barrage of sniping and second-guessing" to which they
have sometimes been subjected.27
But there seems to be a consensus that the lawyer's public image
needs a shine. If the chief lawyers in our system, judges, do not
lead the way, the overall effort to improve civility in the profession
may well fall short.
The sponsoring committees of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, the Committees on Lectures and Continuing
Education, Professional and Judicial Ethics, and Tort Litigation,

26. Editorial, It's Time to End Open Season on Judges, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 26, 1996, at
1-2.
27. Id.
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audience and diverse
were fortunate to have attracted such a wide
28
civility.
judicial
on
panel
its
to
participants

28. See Ethics Opinion, supra note 6 (noting that public criticism of intemperate
judge must be "motivated by a desire to improve the quality of the judiciary and the
legal system in general.").

